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Temporal steering, which is a temporal analogue of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steering, refers to
temporal quantum correlations between the initial and final state of a quantum system. Our analysis
of temporal steering inequalities in relation to the average quantum bit error rates reveals the
interplay between temporal steering and quantum cloning, which guarantees the security of quantum
key-distribution based on mutually-unbiased bases against individual attacks. The key distributions
analyzed here include the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84) and the six-state 1998 protocol
by Bruss (B98). Moreover, we define a temporal steerable weight, which enables us to identify a
kind of monogamy of temporal correlations that is essential to quantum cryptography and useful
for analyzing various scenarios of quantum causality.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Mn, 42.50.Dv
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum steering, also known as Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) steering, refers to quantum correlations,
which enable one system to nonlocally steer (or affect)
another system by using only local measurements. This
concept was introduced by Schro¨dinger [1] over 80 years
ago as a generalization of the EPR paradox [2] and quan-
tum entanglement. Surprisingly, our understanding and
applications of this phenomenon are still very limited
despite of breathtaking research and progress (see, e.g.,
Ref. [3]). For example, a few recent experimental demon-
strations of EPR steering were reported in Refs. [4–12],
including even a loophole-free experiment [6]. This re-
search has also been devoted to analyzing the relations
and potential applications of EPR steering to secure
quantum communication (see, e.g., recent Refs. [13–15]
and references therein).
Temporal steering (TS) is a temporal analog of EPR
steering, and introduced only very recently [16]. Our un-
derstanding of this phenomenon is even more limited [16–
22].
Here we study TS in the context of quantum cryptog-
raphy and fundamental issues of quantum theory includ-
ing quantum cloning and Heraclitus “panta rhei” [23].
Here we study the relation between TS and two quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) protocols: BB84 by Ben-
nett and Brassard [24] and the six-state 1998 protocol
∗ bark@amu.edu.pl
by Bruss (B98) [25]. These two QKD protocols consti-
tute a class of so-called mutually unbiased bases (MUB)
protocols for qubits. By studying these examples in de-
tail, we explain the reason for the security of the MUB
protocols based on temporal steering against individual
attacks. Our results show that the unconditional security
of these protocols [26–28] implies the existence of a kind
of monogamous temporal correlations, which we refer to
as temporal steering monogamy. If the protocols are not
unconditionally secure, it would not be possible to distin-
guish the following two cases: whether the same original
particle or two different particles (e.g., the original and
its copy) are observed at two different moments in time.
This would mean that the famous phrase of Heraclitus
“No man ever steps in the same river twice” [23], taken
literally, could be fundamentally true as there would be
no way of checking if there exists a single reality of par-
ticles observed at two moments in time. We note that
some relations of TS and BB84 have already been found
in the original paper on TS by Chen et al. [16]. Our
analysis reveals a much deeper relation of TS and secure
communication.
In this paper, we also propose and apply a measure
of TS, which can be referred to as a TS weight in anal-
ogy to the EPR steering weight introduced in Ref. [29].
We note that TS and its various measures can also have
other non-cryptographic applications in, e.g., quantifying
strong non-Markovianity, as recently shown in Ref. [21].
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we
present a theoretical framework for analyzing TS. In
Sec. III, we derive TS inequalities for bit-error rates. In
Sec. IV, we introduce the TS weight. We conclude in
2Sec. V.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To set up the theoretical framework for TS, let us
start with the assumption that Alice and Bob share a
secret sequence of qubit (spin- 1
2
) observables that they
will measure. Alternatively, they can select their observ-
ables at random and reject those not matching. Alice
prepares her states from an unknown torrent of qubits
by performing a Stern-Gerlach-type experiment [30] with
photons using a polariser. Specifically, Alice separates
qubits of opposite values of the analysed spin observable.
Let us assume that Alice and Bob use MUB (see, e.g.,
Ref. [31]) and their observables are the Pauli matrices
A1 = B1 = σ1, A2 = B2 = σ2, and A3 = B3 = σ3.
The observables A and B have two eigenvalues a = ±1
and b = ±1, respectively. In our experiment we identify
the observables Ai = Bi with the corresponding Pauli
operators σi. Alice chooses her observable Ai = σi and
its value a = ±1 by a proper polarisation rotation of
the polarised photon. This state preparation strategy is
equivalent to Alice performing her measurement at time
tA = 0 on a photon described by an appropriate polarisa-
tion statistics, and then sending the detected eigenstates
of the observable to Bob. The qubit that is delivered to
Bob is a conditional state that depends on Alice’s choice
of the observable, her outcome, and the initial state of
the transmitted two-level system. The initial state is im-
posed by Alice’s choice of measurement and her results.
The final measured state is an outcome of the state evo-
lution and the specific measurement setting used by Bob.
Subsequently, Bob measures the observable Bj = σj at
time tB.
TS can enable Alice to affect on Bob’s outcomes. This
influence vanishes when Alice and Bob use uncorrelated
bases. In order to consider only nontrivial TS, we need a
channel that provides a nonunitary evolution of the trans-
mitted qubits. This is because a pure unitary evolution
can be seen as the lack of the evolution of the transmitted
photons in an appropriate reference frame used by Bob.
The TS inequality of Chen et al. [16] reads
SN ≡
N∑
i=1
E
[
〈Bi,tB〉
2
Ai,tA
]
≤ 1, (1)
which is satisfied for all classical states. The TS parame-
ter SN that depends on the number N = 2, 3 of unbiased
measurements B performed by Bob. The left-hand-side
of the inequality is a sum over the measurements of the
expectation values
E
[
〈Bi,tB〉
2
Ai,tA
]
≡
∑
a=±1
P (a|Ai,tA) 〈Bi,tB〉
2
a|Ai,tA ,
where the conditional probability
P (a|Ai,tA) ≡
∑
λ
qλPλ(a|Ai,tA)
depends on a classical variable λ that specifies a given
type of channel and qλ, which specifies the probability
of the qubit being transmitted via the channel labelled
by λ. The channel here is understood as a single Kraus
operator from the set of the Kraus operators constituting
the map between the state preselected by Alice and that
delivered to Bob. Note that usually Alice and Bob do not
know the value of λ (if they did, they could reverse the
evolution and maximize SN ) and, thus, this label can be
ignored. Nevertheless, we keep track of this parameter as
we change its value in our experiment. Bob’s outcomes
are related to the state projection performed by Alice, as
〈Bi,tB〉a|Ai,tA ≡
∑
b=±1
b P (b|Ai,tA = a,Bi,tB). (2)
The parameter N(= 2 or 3) represents the number of the
MUB used by Bob to analyse the received qubit. The
TS inequality (1) follows from the non-commutativity of
two observables that can be measured by Alice and Bob.
The inequality is violated when Alice’s choice of observ-
able influences Bob’s result. This could happen only if
the channel has not erased the influence of Alice’s choice.
It could be said that temporal steering quantifies the im-
pact of Alice’s choice on the future local reality of Bob.
This also means that TS could be used to witness the
causality between time-ordered events. Note that when
the TS parameter reaches its maximal value, it is invari-
ant with respect to changing the casual relations between
Alice and Bob [32–37]. In particular, this case could im-
ply the grandfather paradox: [34] Bob flips his measured
state and sends it backward in time to become the state
prepared by Alice.
Breaking the TS inequality corresponds to nonclassical
channel operation causing stronger temporal correlations
between Alice and Bob than the correlations between Al-
ice and the best classical copy of the transmitted state.
The best classical copying strategy is to measure the state
sent by Alice in a random basis and resend the state fur-
ther to Bob. The measurement result can be used to pre-
pare an indefinite number of copies of the state resent to
Bob. In the best case, with the probability 1/N , the ran-
dom choice of basis is compatible with Alice’s and Bob’s
bases and there will be full correlation between them.
However, with the probability (N − 1)/N the choice is
not compatible and with probability (N − 1)/2N Alice
and Bob receive opposite results. The TS inequality can
be related to the average quantum bit error rate (QBER)
by the following general inequality
1
4m
(
M −
SN
N
)
≥ QBERN , (3)
where m and M are the smallest and largest transmis-
sion fidelity of any state sent by Alice (see Sec. III),
respectively. For the procedure described above, we
substitute m = 1/2 (which corresponds to a wrong
choice of bases), M = 1 (for the matched bases), and
QBERN = (N − 1)/2N to arrive at SN ≤ 1. This in-
equality is saturated for the classical copying procedure,
3because there are only two possible random values of the
fidelity (1 and 1/2). Thus, we derived the TS inequality
in a way that allows to interpret its breaking as a certifi-
cate the of lack of quantum collapse and the occurrence
of quantum correlations. This conclusion holds under the
assumption that the sequence of the measurement bases
used by Alice and Bob is secret.
To underline the quantum nature of TS, let us focus
on the security of MUB-based quantum key distribu-
tion, which can only be explained with quantum the-
ory. In this case we can again relate TS with the average
QBER in the raw key obtained by Alice and Bob after
performing the key sifting (basis reconciliation) step in
their MUB protocol (see Sec. III). This relation reads
QBERN ≥ (1−
√
SN/N)/2, where the inequality is sat-
urated in the case of isotropic noise. Note that there is no
fundamental reason for considering an anisotropic noise.
In fact, making the noise isotropic is the best strategy
for keeping an eavesdropper undetected. In the MUB
protocols, Alice sends all her basis states to Bob with
equal probabilities, hence there is no preferred direction.
For each of the two QKD protocols there exist a minimal
value of QBERN = qN for which the respective protocol
is no longer secure. When we consider individual at-
tacks, these values are q2 =
1
2
(1− 1√
2
) for BB84 (N = 2)
and q3 =
1
6
for B98 (N = 3). The values of the QBER
correspond to the amount of noise introduced by the re-
spective optimal isotropic cloning processes, designed to
copy the states sent by Alice. The two cloning regimes
are referred to as phase-covariant and universal cloning
for N = 2 and N = 3, respectively. The relation be-
tween optimal quantum cloning and the security of these
QKD protocols was studied in various works (see, e.g.,
Refs. [38–42] and references therein). This connection to
optimal quantum copying is anticipated since the secu-
rity of the MUB-based QKD protocols is guaranteed by
the impossibility of ideal copying of an unknown quan-
tum state [43, 44]. The no-cloning theorem also explains
why it is impossible to send information faster than light.
For any attack, the security condition can then be stated
as
qN > QBERN ≥
1
2
(
1−
√
SN
N
)
. (4)
We can verify this security only if we know a specific value
of QBERN . The TS parameter SN is especially useful
in the case of symmetric noise, where SN = 4N(
1
2
−
QBERN )
2 [or QBERN = (1 −
√
SN/N)/2] and security
condition can be rewritten as
SN > N(1− 2qN)
2 =⇒ QBERN < qN . (5)
In general, the violation of the security condition (5) pro-
vides the maximal values of SN = N(1−2qN)
2 for which
the relevant QKD protocols are insecure (QBERN =
qN ). Remarkably, we can show that Eq. (5) holds also
for asymmetric noise. Note that it holds (1 − M) ≤
QBERN ≤ (1 −m), where M and m are defined below
Eq. (3). From this it follows that reaching QBERN ≥ qN ,
which is needed to break the QKD protocols, requires
at least satisfying m = 1 − qN . Now, let us assume
that the inequality SN > N(1 − 2qN )
2 is satisfied, then
QBERN ≥ qN or QBERN < qN (which is a trivial case).
If QBERN ≥ qN , then from Eq. (3) for m = 1 − qN it
follows that SN ≤ N(M − 4mqN ) = N(M − 2qN)
2. This
contradicts the SN > N(1− 2qN)
2 assumption for an ar-
bitrary value of M > 1 − qN (up to M = 1) and, hence,
concludes the proof.
The security condition SN > N(1−2qN)
2 can be inter-
preted as a temporal monogamy relation [corresponding
to the violation of the TS inequality given in Eq. (1)] for
individual attacks (when qN is defined by the isotropic
optimal cloning) or collective attacks (when qN ∝ 0.1 is
defined by an unconditional security threshold [26, 27]),
respectively. The monogamy of temporal correlations is
guaranteed by the secrecy of the sequence of MUBs. If
the unconditional security bounds are reached and even
if the environment had access to all the instances of the
experiment simultaneously, then the environment cannot
be better correlated with Alice than Bob without know-
ing the sequence of MUBs before Bob’s measurements
(it contains his detector but not Alice’s setup). This
also means that by breaking the TS inequality [given in
Eq. (1)] by this proper amount, one certifies the existence
of the monogamous quantum causality, i.e., from the cor-
relations we can infer that Alice steered Bob’s outcomes
more than any other party. In this scenario, the correla-
tion means quantum causation. Moreover, this causation
is monogamous.
The limiting values of the TS parameters are S2 = 1
(at the TS-inequality threshold) and S3 = 4/3 > 1
(above the TS-inequality threshold). Moreover, these
values of SN imply that the average transfer fidelity is
FN = 1 − QBERN > 1 − qN above the optimal cloning
threshold. This means that the temporal correlations of
such strength cannot be reproduced by probing a sin-
gle photon sent by Alice in any physically possible way.
From the above analysis it follows that the violation of
the TS inequality is a necessary, but not sufficient con-
dition for the security of the QKD protocols based on
MUB against individual attacks. The sufficient condi-
tion provided in Eq. (5) can be interpreted as breaking
a stronger form of the TS inequality, i.e., S2 ≤ 1 and
S3 ≤ 4/3 or SN ≤ 2
N−1/N . If this inequality is not bro-
ken, then Alice and Bob should abort their QKD pro-
tocol. As found by Chen et al. [16], violating the origi-
nal S2 inequality certifies the security of BB84 bounded
by the fundamental physical limitation given by the no-
cloning theorem [43, 44]. However, by implementing co-
herent attacks (where all the particles sent by Bob are
treated collectively), Eve can induce less noise, which
implies a smaller value of qN than that for individual at-
tacks (under the assumption that the sequence of bases
used by Alice and Bob is revealed). We can still use SN
to check the security of the relevant QKD protocol by
applying Eq. (5). However, we cannot use it to quan-
4tify TS. Analogously to quantifying nonlocality [45, 46],
defining a good measure of steering is not a simple task.
EPR steering has been studied with specially-designed
inequalities leading to all-versus-nothing measures [47].
Recently, Skrzypczyk et al. [29] proposed to quantify
EPR steering with a steerable weight. This measure is de-
scribed by a semidefinite program that can be efficiently
implemented and provides an interesting tool for further
study of steering. The approach described by the authors
of Ref. [29] is “allowing one to explore a wide variety
of quantum states and measurement scenarios.” How-
ever, to our knowledge, a closed formula for the steerable
weight has not been found yet, even for the simplest sce-
nario. As we show in this paper, this measure can be
applied to experimental data to detect the existence of
the TS.
III. TEMPORAL STEERING INEQUALITIES
AND QBER
Here, we present our theoretical findings relating the
temporal steering inequalities and the security of QKD
protocols against individual attacks for the important
case of isotropic noise. Let us rewrite the steering in-
equality for the specific case of QKD protocols, where we
assume that Bi = Ai. This is granted by the construction
of the QKD protocols, where any other choice of the ob-
servable Bi is not allowed (and it is rejected). The value
of P (b|Ai,tA = a,Bi,tB) corresponds to the conditional
probability of Bob measuring the value b under the con-
dition that his measurement basis is Bi and Alice sent an
eigenstate observable Ai of value a. This probability can
be now interpreted as the fidelity Fi(a, b) between the
state measured by Alice and the state delivered to Bob if
b = a. Alternatively, the probability equals 1−Fi(a,−b)
for b = −a. Therefore, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
〈Bi,tB〉a|Ai,tA
≡ 2Fi(a, 1)− 1 = 1− 2Fi(a,−1).
Thus,
〈Bi,tB〉
2
a|Ai,tA
= (2Fi,a − 1)
2,
where Fi,a = Fi(a, b = a) is the transmission fidelity
of the eigenstate of Ai associated with the eigenvalue a.
Now, it follows from P (a, b|Ai,tA , Bi,tB) =
1
2
, fixed by the
construction of the protocols, that the steering inequality
can be rewritten as
SN ≡
1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
a=±1
(2Fi,a − 1)
2 ≤ 1.
It is now apparent that the quantity SN can be inter-
preted as N times the arithmetic mean of (2Fi,a − 1)
2.
This, quantity can be easily related to the average fidelity
using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality that implies
√
NSN ≥
N∑
i=1
∑
a=±1
(Fi,a −
1
2
) = 2N(FN −
1
2
),
where FN is the mean transmission fidelity. In the MUB-
based protocols, the QBER is directly related to the
mean fidelity, i.e., QBERN = 1 − FN . This finally leads
to the following inequality
QBERN ≥
1
2
(
1−
√
SN
N
)
,
which is saturated if Fi,a = FN ≥
1
2
. Using the expansion
of SN in terms of Fi,a, and the definition of QBERN , we
can write
〈F 2〉 = 1
2N
N∑
i=1
∑
a=±1
F 2i,a = 1−QBERN +
SN −N
4N
.
Let 〈(F − FN )
2〉 = σ2 be the variance of F , where FN is
its mean value. Then, we can express the variance as
σ2 = QBERN (1−QBERN ) +
SN −N
4N
. (6)
There exists a strong inequality limiting the values of σ
from above, i.e., the Barnett-Dragomir [48] (or Bhatia-
Davis [49]) inequality for the variable F (which takes,
with the same probability, one of the values of Fi,a for
i = 1, 2, 3 and a = ±1) that reads
σ2 ≤ (M − FN )(FN −m), (7)
where M is the largest and m the smallest allowed value
of Fi,a. By substituting σ
2 in Eq. (7) with the expression
given in Eq. (6) we obtain
QBERN ≤
1
4m
(
M − SN
N
)
.
This is an upper bound on QBERN , which is saturated
if FN = M or FN = m. It is physically justified to use
M = 1 (no noise) and m = 1
2
(only noise) or m = 3
4
(the
same amounts of signal and noise). A fundamental limit
on transferring information with the particular basis is
for m = 1
2
. If it is reached by one of the states, the
number of usable MUB is reduced by one. However, for
practical purposes, the case m = 3
4
is more interesting as
it is related to the quantum limit on fidelity of optimal
cloning. This means that this value is at the quantum
threshold of the TS inequality. The value of m = 3
4
indicates that we do not use the QKD protocol if any
of its basis states is transmitted with the probability of
being randomly flipped to the orthogonal state larger
than 1
2
. This refers to the case where a state is replaced,
with probability 1
2
, by a completely mixed state.
IV. TEMPORAL STEERABLE WEIGHT
To quantify temporal steering we introduce a di-
rect counterpart of the EPR steering weight defined by
Skrzypczyk et al. [29] The set of Alice’s observables
5and her outcomes is given in the form of an assemblage
{ρa|Ai(tA)}a,i. The assemblage encodes the conditional
probability of Alice obtaining the result a when mea-
suring the observable Ai, i.e., P (a|Ai) = tr[ρa|Ai(tA)]
and the states that are sent to Bob ρˆa|Ai(tA) =
ρa|Ai,tA (tA)/P (a|Ai,tA). The states received by Bob at
time tB are altered by a non-unitary channel. Thus,
Bob performs his measurements on the assemblage
{ρa|Ai(tB)}a,i ≡ {ρa|Ai}a,i. A valid assemblage must sat-
isfy the following consistency relation
tr
∑
a=±1
ρa|Ai = 1 ∀i = 1, 2, 3. (8)
The above relations ensure that Bob receives a valid
quantum state.
The unsteerable assemblages, as defined in Ref. [29],
can be created independently of Alice’s choice of observ-
able (i.e., without entangling Alice’s measurement out-
come with the state received by Bob), and can be written
in the following form
ρa|Ai =
∑
γ
Dγ(a|Ai)ργ ∀a, i,
such that tr
∑
γ
ργ = 1, ργ ≥ 0 ∀γ,
(9)
where γ is a (classical) random variable held by Alice,
ργ are the states received by Bob, and Dγ(a|Ai) are Al-
ice’s deterministic functions that map Alice’s variable γ
to a specific pair of the observable Ai and outcome a.
Here we consider only the cases for N = 2, 3 and we
list our choices of Dγ(a|Ai) in Tables I and II. Assum-
ing that N = 3, we can use Tab. II to find that, e.g.,
ρ+1|A1 =
∑4
n=1 ρn or ρ−1|A1 =
∑8
n=5 ρn, etc. The above-
described model of unsteerable assemblage is also known
as the local hidden state (LHS) model. The assemblage
that can be described by this model is independent of
Alice’s choice of her observable Ai, i.e., it is given by
Eq. (9). For other (steerable) assemblages there is no
explanation for how the different conditional states Bob
received could have been prepared by Alice without her
performing the measurements of Ai or sending the eigen-
states of Ai. This is why temporal steering is a neces-
sary condition for implementing the QKD protocols using
MUB.
Note that in order to calculate the TS weight wt,2 for
BB84 (or wt,3 for B98), similarly as in the estimation of
the QBER in BB84, Alice has to disclose which bases and
Bob has to disclose his measurement results to Alice. To
perform these calculations, she has to define the assem-
blage that needs to satisfy the consistency relation (8).
The valid assemblage (just before Bob’s measurements)
is given by ρa|Ai =
1
2
ρˆa|Ai(tB). We can rewrite this as-
semblage as
ρa|Ai =
∑
b,b′=±1
〈b, Bi|ρa|Ai |b
′, Bi〉|b, Bi〉〈b′, Bi|,
TABLE I. Values of deterministic functions Dγ(a|A) and the
number of unbiased observables for BB84 (N = 2). It is shown
for each function Dγ(a|A) how the variable γ is mapped to a
specific set of observables A and their eigenvalues a.
a|A D1 D2 D3 D4
−1|A1 0 0 1 1
+1|A1 1 1 0 0
−1|A2 1 0 1 0
+1|A2 0 1 0 1
TABLE II. Same as in Table I, but for B98 (N = 3).
a|A D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
−1|A1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
+1|A1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
−1|A2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
+1|A2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
−1|A3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
+1|A3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
or, in the special case of Ai = Bi
ρa|Ai =
∑
a′,a′′=±1
〈a′, Ai|ρa|Ai |a
′′|Ai〉|a′, Ai〉〈a′′, Ai|
=
1
2
∑
a′=±1
Fi(a, a
′)|a′, Ai〉〈a′, Ai|+ ρa′ 6=a′′ .
The matrix
ρa′ 6=a =
∑
a′ 6=a′′
〈a′, Ai|ρa|Ai |a
′′|Ai〉|a′′|Ai〉|a′, Ai〉〈a′′, Ai|
contains correlations that are neglected when calculating
the SN parameter and it makes the TS weight invariant
under any unitary evolution of the assemblage equivalent
to a rotation of Bob’s measurement bases. To obtain this
assemblage experimentally, Bob performs quantum state
tomography of the received qubit.
The TS weight wt is defined as the minimal amount of
strictly steerable resources that is needed to express an
arbitrary assemblage in the following way
ρa|Ai = wtρ
S
a|Ai + (1− wt)ρ
US
a|Ai ∀a, i, (10)
where ρSa|Ai is a genuine steerable assemblage and ρ
US
a|Ai is
unsteerable [as defined by Eq. (9)]. The minimum value
of 0 ≤ wt ≤ 1 for which Eq. (10) is satisfied is the TS
weight. As shown in Ref. [29] the value of wt is com-
puted as the solution to the following semidefinite pro-
gram (SDP)
max tr
∑
γ
ργ
such that ρa|Ai −
∑
γ
Dγ(a|Ai)ργ ≥ 0 ∀a, i,
ργ ≥ 0 ∀γ.
6This SDP can be solved efficiently for small matrices,
which is the case in our experiment. For this purpose
we used two SDP packages which provide consistent
results [50–52]. By analogy with the TS inequality,
we might expect that for a given number of MUB N ,
there exists a value of the TS weight above which the
relevant MUB protocol is secure against individual
attacks [16, 42]. However, finding the limiting value
of the TS weight for N = 3 is a difficult task because
of the lack of a closed formula for the TS weight and
the lack of an apparent direct relation between the TS
weight and the TS inequality. Nevertheless, for N = 2
and uniform noise in the observables, we can show
that the limiting value of the TS weight is 0. This is
because the temporal steerability of an assemblage can
be demonstrated by the violation of the TS inequal-
ity (1) or, equivalently, by reaching wt > 0. Thus, for
N = 2 the violation of the TS inequality or reaching
wt > 0 is a necessary and sufficient security condition
for the relevant QKD protocol against individual attacks.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We analysed temporal steering, which is a time-like
analog of EPR steering. The concept of TS is a use-
ful idea that can be applied to the analysis of QKD
protocols. As we showed in this paper, the TS can be
easily observed experimentally, but its relation to MUB-
based QKD protocols is more complex than originally
suspected [16]. The inequality in Eq. (4) provides a
lower bound on the QBER related to the TS parameter
SN for cryptographic systems with arbitrary (isotropic
or anisotropic) noise. In the special case of isotropic
noise (which is the case for BB84), we found that the
TS parameter SN is a simple function of the average
transmission fidelity (or, equivalently, the QBER) and
the number of MUB used in the protocol. We also found
an upper bound on the QBER in terms of SN given by
Eq. (3). This relation has also other physical implications
beyond testing the security of the QKD protocols for
m = 1/2. The value of FN = (N + 1)/(2N) corresponds
to the classical limit of the fidelity of optimally copying
the evolving state, i.e., splitting the original system into
two equivalently steerable subsystems using such devices
that process only classical information. Thus, if we set
qN = 1−FN = (N−1)/(2N) in Eq. (3) and allow an arbi-
trary amount of noise (m = 1/2), then we derive the TS
threshold at SN > 1. The TS is a quantum phenomenon,
if the sequence of basis is secret.
There exists a deep relation between the impossibility
of performing perfect quantum cloning and the impos-
sibility of sending information faster than light. This
implies that there are values of SN above which it is im-
possible for Bob to obtain the outcomes reproducing the
correlations before the photon is physically sent by Alice
(reaching his setup) or it is successfully teleported (so
the original one is destroyed). These values correspond
to the quantum-classical cloning threshold, which implies
SN ≤ 1. Reaching SN above these limiting values implies
that Bob has no access to his future results before Alice’s
photon has been successfully delivered. This also means
that Bob witnesses quantum TS because his results can
be counterfeited using only quantum phenomena. Fi-
nally, an individual photon cannot be counterfeited by
any quantum process if SN > 2
N−1/N . In this case, Bob
witnesses the monogamy quantum TS.
There is also another fundamental implication of
Eqs. (4) and (3) as they explain when we deal with this
monogamous quantum TS. If the security conditions are
violated, then temporal correlations can be induced not
only by the particle sent by Bob, but also by, e.g., its
clone. Therefore, this basic requirement on the original
temporal correlations is no longer satisfied as other re-
sources may lead to the same effect. If, on the other hand,
there is no physically possible way to witness TS with-
out delivering the original particle, we can be sure that
the assumptions used in the definition of TS are valid.
This situation coincides with the unconditional security
threshold [26–28] (there exist values of qN > 0 for which
the protocols are secure) for MUB-based protocols. This
corresponds to qN ≈ 0.1 for N = 2, 3. Note that if the
protocols would not be unconditionally secure (qN = 0),
then this implies the nonexistence of the monogamous
quantum TS. Thus, we could not distinguish two cases:
whether the same original particle or two different parti-
cles (e.g., the original and its copy) are observed at two
different moments in time. This would mean that the
famous phrase of Heraclitus “No man ever steps in the
same river twice”, taken literally, could be fundamentally
true as there would be now a way of checking if there
exists a single reality of particles evolving in time. How-
ever, the unconditional security of MUB-protocols shows
that the converse is true because the photons probed in
our experiment display genuine TS. Therefore, the MUB-
protocols are unconditionally secure (against individual
attacks) because it is possible to test whether a parti-
cle is the same or not in time-delayed observations via
genuine TS, which reveals stronger temporal autocorre-
lations than temporal correlations between itself and any
other particle. This can be referred to as the monogamy
of temporal correlations. Note that all the above conclu-
sions are valid assuming the sequence of MUBs shared by
Alice and Bob is secret. Our paper introduces the con-
cept of the monogamy of quantum causality and relates
it to TS. Further study of this concept in the context
of casual structures, casual inference, and the casuality
of quantum information could lead to new fundamental
discoveries [32–37]. Finally we note that the temporal
steerable weight has recently been described in Ref. [21],
in parallel, to this article [53].
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